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At the beginning of the third chapter of this book, Lal makes reference to the political historian, 
Francis Fukuyama, and his highly influential “End of History”, published in the heady days 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This is apt, as, in many ways, 
Lal’s “War or Peace” is reminiscent of that earlier analysis of the state of the world at a major 
geopolitical turning point. In Lal’s words, Fukuyama presented a thesis of “the global victory of 
the market over the plan” (p.111). While things have not quite turned out the way Fukuyama 
expected, in the sense that authoritarian powers such as China and Russia have not only 
survived the fin de siècle but arguably flexed their muscles on the international stage with 
renewed confidence, Lal advocates a similar formula for the way ahead in no uncertain terms.  
 
War or Peace is an unashamedly strong advocate of the power and rightesousness of Anglo-
Saxon small-state capitalism to reassert its dominance over the global economy and polity. Lal 
shares with Fukuyama an impressive grasp of the historical unfolding of the world’s great 
empires, from China to Rome and the US. Lal adds an extra dimension of considering India 
within the geopolitical melting-pot, reminding us that it is a regional and – potentially – global 
counterbalance to China’s rise. He is also, through his experience in the 1980s of research 
administrator at the World Bank and consultant to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, able to offer an extremely detailed economic understanding of world 
markets, and to frame geopolitical developments in these terms.  
 
In this way, Lal is able to depict dirigiste powers such as Russia and China as paper tigers, 
whose apparent strength and reach are belied by structural frailties in their economies that will 
eventually spell their demise. The US, meanwhile, remains the undisputed hegemon in terms 
of its economic and military power, despite the hand-wringing of “declinists”, in whose camp 
former President Obama is repeatedly included. Consider, for example, the fact that the 
tonnage of the US navy remains more than that of the next 13 navies combined (p.338). Or 
that, of the top 20 universities in the word, all but one are in either the US or the UK; with the 
one other in Japan (p.342). In Lal’s view, far from declining, the US is likely to resurge as the 
globe’s unchallenged superpower.  
 
War or Peace was written just after Trump rose to power in the US, and, like many observers, 
Lal expresses uncertainty over what will happen. Insofar as Trumpism can be defined, however, 
there are clear elements of it in Lal’s analysis. Using a selective set of data, for example, 
anthropomorphic climate change is dismissed (pp.212-3). The unfettered exploitation of shale 
gas is championed both as a tremendous economic opportunity for Western powers, and a 
geopolitical opportunity, in the sense that it will ensure that the US does not have to be 
dependent on Gulf supplies of oil or on their manipulation of the world oil price. All of this is 
presented without any mention of environmental concerns, and a quick dismissal of the long-
term ills of relying on carbon fossil fuels. Indeed, environmentalists are dismissed as “rabid” on 
one occasion (p.226), and sustainable sources such as wind and solar as an unreliable waste 
of time.  
 
Any discomfort experienced by more liberal readers of War or Peace might be heightened by 
Lal’s prescription for the problem of Islamist terrorism in the Middle East. Here, a separationist 
argument is put forward, whereby the Middle East can be surrounded by a cordon sanitaire and 
allowed to stew in its own juices, until it eventually has a Peace of Westphalia moment. Such 
ideas have previously been the reserve of more extreme and isolationist American thinkers on 
21st century world problems, and could be argued to remain flawed in terms of the logic of 
applying nineteenth century containment ideas to an interconnected and globalised world.  
 
Those in favour of Brexit will be cheered by Lal’s suggestion that the UK should escape with 
haste from an increasingly “sclerotic” EU, that is locked in a “slow dance of death” (p.165).  
 
Indeed, if one takes Lal’s wholly market-centric and anti-dirigiste approach to world affairs, 
without any complications arising from ideology or cultural history, many of his prescriptions 
have some logic and at least offer an alternative view to normative, Western-declinist views. 
There is much to be said, for example, in reading behind the shorter-term alarmism of Russia 
and China’s emergence on the world stage, and considering underpinning structural factors. 
These do indeed reveal that such authoritarian powers still have a long way to go and could 
easily falter on the way. Similarly, the US could certainly be Great Again if it makes the right 
choices.  
 
At the same time, one wonders if the critiques that were levelled at Fukuyama’s earlier thesis, 
and indeed at the contemporaneous thesis of a “clash of civilisations” put forward by Samuel 
Huntington in the 1990s, could not also be directed at Lal’s analysis. In particular, can cordons 
sanitaires really be considered in the highly interconnected global polity and economy? And is 
it sensible to talk-up the inevitability of armed conflict with China, as Lal seems to do here, when 
more careful diplomatic approaches could be considered? Surely China’s reliance on a healthy 
global economy might give it cause to pause from catastrophic confrontation? Lal might dismiss 
such ideas as “limp” (a charge levelled at Obama) and reminiscent of Chamberlain’s attempted 
appeasement of Hitler. But perhaps the 21st century world is more complicated than that of 
previous centuries.  
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